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ABSTRACT:  Increases in U.S. income inequality are driven primarily by rapidly rising incomes of the 
top 1%. At the national scale, rising inequality is associated with negative consequences for 
economic growth and stability, a range of social problems and declining social mobility. To date, 
there is no or little work on the geography of the top 1% and their impact on the cities they inhabit. 
Using individual income data from the U.S. Census, the paper offers the first detailed analysis of the 
spatial distribution of the top 1% in the United States. The paper makes use of the range of socio-
demographic variables attached to individual records to illustrate that the large majority of the top 
1% lives in large cities and that women and ethnic minorities are largely excluded from membership 
in the top 1%. The widening gap between incomes at the top and bottom will thus lead to increasing 
gender and ethnic income inequalities. Exploratory analysis of the impact of the top 1% on the 
bottom 99% suggests that cities with large shares of the top 1% are characterized by higher levels of 
skill polarization, higher labor force participation rates and lower unemployment rates for those with 
little formal education and higher median incomes for the better educated. However, the paper 
shows that higher incomes are outstripped by higher housing costs indicating that any potential 
advantage trickling down from the top 1% to the bottom 99% is eroded by higher living costs. 
Preliminary analysis also suggests that cities with a higher share of the top 1% tend to be more 
segregated with potential implications for the supply, quality, access to and distribution of public 
local services.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, income inequality rose to levels not seen since the Great Depression in the 
United States. This rise of inequality was driven primarily by disproportionately large increases in 
income at the top of the income distribution while median and bottom incomes stagnated or rose 
only modestly (Atkinson et al. 2007; Piketty and Saez 2003; Mishel and Bivens 2011; Piketty 2014). 
Explanations of the causes and consequences of rising inequality are still contested.  
Economists tend to favour “external” causes of increasing inequality such as skill-biased 
technological change (Katz and Murphy 1992, Author et al. 2003; Levy and Murnane 2004, Author et 
al. 2008), increasing trade with countries in the global South (Krugman 2008; Rigby and Breau 2010), 
or immigration of low-skilled labor (Borgas 2003). None of these explanations can account for the 
rising income shares of the top 1%. Even worse, those theories struggle to make sense of 
international comparisons (Atkinson et al. 2003) and the historical record on income inequality in 
the U.S. (Card and diNardo 2002, Goldin and Katz 2008). It is therefore unsurprising that sociologists, 
political scientists and increasingly economists look for institutional explanations to account for the 
rising income shares of the rich and super-rich1. Labour economists and political scientists believe 
the Taft-Hartley act initiated the long decline of power of the labor unions and through that, 
bargaining power of labour against capital (Card 2001; Card and diNardo 2002, Geoghegan 2004;  
Levy and Temin 2007; Hacker and Pierson 2010, Fleck et al. 2011). This was coupled with a decline in 
top tax rates (Piketty and Saez 2007; Piketty et al. 2014; Tax Policy Center 2014), liberalisation of 
global financial flows allowing for tax havens in and outside the U.S. (Shaxson 2011, Palan et al. 
2010) and ideological capture of the discourse on social justice and equality (Dorling 2011, 2014; 
Stiglitz 2012). Noah (2010) summarises those theories and believes that they all offer partial 
explanations of causes that contribute to rising inequality, although he puts a greater emphasis on 
institutional explanations.  This paper does not address the causes of relative increases of top 
incomes but takes this rise as historical fact. More important for the purpose of this paper are the 
potential consequences for society if top incomes increase disproportionally. 
Those on the right argue that inequality is necessary and positive for economy and society (Welch 
1999) as it creates incentives, makes people try and work harder and so increases productivity and 
economic growth of national economies. Gains from growth are then supposed  to trickle down to 
benefit everybody. As a result a rising tide is supposed to lift all boats and the trade-off between 
inequality and economic growth is necessary to increase social welfare in the long run (Okun 1975). 
This view assumes that hard work is remunerated and that everybody has the opportunity to move 
up the income hierarchy as long as they work hard.  While it may well be the case that some 
inequality is necessary to incentivise people, the link between incentives-hard work-productivity-
remuneration is not observed empirically in the U.S. On the one hand, wages of ordinary workers are 
no longer linked to productivity increases (Fleck et al. 2011) while on the other, pay rises are not 
matched by productivity increases for those at the top (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005;  Mischel and Sabadish 2012; Philippon and Reshef 2012). The incentive view 
resonates with the American myth as land of opportunity (Gelman 2010, Mettler 2010). However, 
social mobility in the U.S. is lower than in almost all other developed economies and there is a strong 
                                                          
1
 There is no agreed convention on how to label different parts of the top of the income or wealth distribution 
(Hay 2013). Here the top 1% is labelled as “rich” while the top 0.1% and 0.01% are labelled as “super-rich”. The 
top 1% refers to the income that demarcates the richest 1% of individuals from the bottom 99%.  
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statistical relationship between a country’s level of inequality and the lack of social mobility (OECD 
2008). In unequal countries the poor have less chance to move up while the rich have less chance to 
move down. The second problem is that the rising tide does not lift all boats. As Mishel and Bivens 
(2011) show, between 1979 and 2007, inflation-adjusted average annual incomes (wages and 
salaries plus interest, dividend and capital incomes) increased by 390% for the top 0.1%, 224% for 
the top 1%, and only 5% for the bottom 90% of U.S. households. As a result the top 1% captures a 
much larger fraction of the national economic pie in 2014 than they did in the early 1980s. The data 
show that increasing inequality is the result of rising top incomes and they suggest that the 
incentive-productivity-growth argument does not hold. But while it may be the case that higher 
levels of inequality do not yield positive effects, the question is whether there are negative effects 
on the economy.  
A large number of studies reveal relationships between inequality and economic and social 
outcomes. The majority of are carried out at the national scale. Contrary to past understanding that 
inequality incentivizes those at the bottom of the distribution to work harder, this is not the case if 
people think they live in an unfair society (Stiglitz 2012). The perception of living in an unfair society 
actually reduces motivation resulting in lower efficiency. Inequality not only reduces motivation but 
also erodes trust (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) which may result in political apathy (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010) and unwillingness to contribute to society through taxes. In addition to the negative 
social consequences of inequality, once it passes a certain threshold, higher levels of inequality also 
reduce economic growth and increase economic instability (Galbraith 2012, Ostry et al. 2014). One 
causal channel works through lower aggregate demand. As the propensity to save is higher among 
the rich than among the poor, an upward distribution of income will result in lower aggregate 
demand. A relatively small shift from the top 1% to the bottom and middle income groups could 
increase economic growth by 2% a year and reduce unemployment rates to 6% (Stiglitz 2012, Piketty 
et al. 2014). More recent literature goes further and establishes a relationship between inequality 
and the Great Recession as declining or stagnating income at the bottom and middle of the income 
distribution was supplemented through loans (often backed by apparent house price increases). 
Rising private debt loads contributed significantly to the credit bubble which burst eventually in 
2007 (Rajan 2010; Galbraith 2012). For cross country studies it can be shown that the financial crisis 
was indeed more pronounced in debt-driven rather than savings driven accumulation regimes 
(Onaran and Galanis 2012; Stockhammer 2013; Goda et al. 2014).  
Other cross-sectional studies looked at the relationship between inequality and lack of social 
mobility (OECD 2008), negative physical and mental health implications (Mendes et al. 2008; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Dorling 2011), as well as crime and incarceration rates (Wang and 
Arnold 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). And finally, if political votes depend on private donations 
and changes in legislation are strongly influenced by lobbyists, then a highly skewed income 
distribution towards the top will allow them to capture the political process and so erode democracy 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Stiglitz 2012). While this literature is situated at the national scale, 
geographers and sociologists pushed forward research on inequality at the urban and regional 
scales.  
First, the literature on social stratification started to explore the link between social and spatial 
segregation. While segregation by race has declined in most cities, segregation by income increased 
(Massey and Fischer 2003; Massey 2007; Watson 2009; Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Second, work 
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on the role of neighbourhood effects on people’s opinions, preferences, opportunities and 
characteristics develops theoretical and empirical links between neighbourhood diversity and 
belonging (Galster 2010; Finney and Jivraj 2013), attitudes towards the poor and welfare 
expenditures (Baily et al. 2013) and the impact of neighbourhood poverty on people’s life chances 
(Van Ham et al. 2012; Hedman et al. 2012). Third the literature on gentrification examines the 
impact of displacement effects on social mix, economic regeneration and opportunity for incumbent 
residents and the displaced (Jargowsky 1996, Hamnett 2003; Lees 2006). This literature is concerned 
implicitly with social stratification, social mix of neighborhoods and impact on house prices, but does 
not discuss explicitly the impact of urban inequality or the share of the top 1% on stratification, 
segregation, house price development, job opportunities, social attitudes, social mobility, 
infrastructure development and public resources.  
This paper explores links between the literature on inequality and the top 1% at the national scale 
and the work on social stratification and segregation on the urban scale. The top 1% were chosen 
rather than the GINI coefficient or other income ratios, because in recent years inequality in the U.S. 
has been driven by increasing income shares claimed by the top of the income distribution (Piketty 
and Saez 2003), it entered public discourse through popularisation by the “Occupy” and other social 
movements and thus warrants further academic research (Breau 2014), and any policy to reduce 
inequality is likely to be most successful if it targets the top 1% (Dorling 2014). Studying the top 1% 
rather than the top 5% is justified because the bottom 99% become increasingly homogenous in 
terms of income while the top 1% are occupying, almost literally, a different planet from them (Hay 
2013; Dorling 2014). The question is whether it would be more appropriate to study the top 0.5 or 
0.1 percent as differentiation among the top 1% is proceeding rapidly. Unfortunately top-coding of 
income data from the U.S. Census does not permit a more detailed analysis.  
In order to carry out that research, the paper makes use of the integrated public use micro-data 
series (IPUMS) based on the American Community Survey (ACS) and made available by the 
Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles et al. 2010). While income data in the ACS are self-reported 
and probably somewhat less accurate than tax return data, using IPUMS rather than tax returns has 
a number of advantages: First, it is possible to get a detailed picture of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the top 1%. Second, it is possible to allocate the top 1% to metropolitan areas and 
look at the share of the rich in each metropolitan area. Third, we can explore links between the 
share of the top 1% in metropolitan areas and selected economic and social consequences for the 
bottom 99% living in those areas.  
As a rising income share of this group is to blame for the rise in social inequality more generally, the 
distribution of the top 1% across metropolitan areas has an impact on inter-urban inequality 
(Galbraith 2012). Examining geographic differences in the shares of the top 1% is thus important for 
our understanding of inter-urban inequality more generally. Furthermore, spatial inequality does not 
only increase at the inter-urban scale but increasingly between neighborhoods within metropolitan 
areas and the consequences of income segregation on the rest of the urban population warrants 
attention (Watson 2009).The paper thus provides a first account of the geographic distribution and 
characteristics of the top 1% across U.S. metropolitan areas and explores links to social and 
economic characteristics of those cities. Links are explored to (1) Employment, education and wages; 
(2) House values/rent and affordability; (3) Spatial segregation. 
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(1) While the literature suggests that a skewed income distribution dampens economic growth 
and reduces employment opportunities, the negative relationship may not be observed 
necessarily at the urban scale. There are a number of reasons why a higher share of the top 
1% could be linked to lower unemployment rates and higher wages. First of all, the top 1% is 
generally well educated and rarely unemployed. Everything else equal a higher share of the 
top 1% should result in lower urban unemployment rates and higher median wages. Second, 
the top 1% tends to work in high paying service industries such as banking and finance that 
are dependent on low-paying services to function (Sassen 2001). Furthermore the top 1% is 
likely to spend some of their income on locally produced products and services that may 
generate jobs and lower unemployment rates for those with lower levels of educational 
attainment. Demand for those products and services could drive up prices resulting in 
relatively higher wages of the bottom 99%.  
 
(2) While the presence of the rich may increase wages of the poor, those wage increases could 
be nullified by higher prices for accommodation and costs for non-tradable services. House 
prices and rents can be driven up because the rich can bid up prices for housing (given that 
the stock of housing tends to be fixed in the short run) at the top of the housing market that 
can have knock on effects on the lower end of the housing market. They may also use their 
wealth to buy property as investment objects. This will reduce supply and hence, drive up 
prices further. Because we know how much people with different education levels in 
different cities earn and how much they spend on rent/housing we can examine whether 
the potentially positive impact on jobs and wages is eradicated by the cost for housing.  
 
(3) One of the key issues addressed by the inequality literature at the national scale and the 
neighbourhood effects/segregation literature is the influence of social context on beliefs, 
opinion, and behaviour that will inform perceptions of economic and social reality as well as 
polices to change them (Page et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2013). Spatial segregation exacerbates 
and cements differences (Massey 2007). If the top 1% live segregated from the bottom 99% 
and do not know how they get by, they are less likely to support re-distributive policies, job 
generation programs or provision of public services. In addition, if they live in well-resourced 
enclaves and rely disproportionally on private rather than public health and educational 
facilities, they are more likely to oppose tax rises or spending on those services which 
benefit the bottom 99% disproportionately. In this sense, spatial segregation can increase 
future inequality in incomes and standards of living and we thus have to examine whether a 
large presence of the top 1% is linked to higher levels of segregation in those cities (Breau 
and Essletzbichler 2013).  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Because incomes are top-coded in official population and community surveys, until recently work on 
the top 1% relied exclusively on tax return data (eg. Piketty and Saez 2003). However, since 2003 top 
code values are set high enough so that the top 1% can be distinguished from the bottom 99%. More 
specifically top codes are set at the 99.5th percentile in each state. Values at or above this threshold 
are set to the state mean of the incomes that exceed the threshold. Because none of the state top 
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codes falls below the national top 1% income threshold we can accurately identify the top 1% in the 
IPUMS data. However, because we do not know the precise income of each member in the top 1% 
we cannot calculate their share in total income (Partridge and Weinstein 2013).  
The data for this paper are drawn from the pooled 2007-2011 American Community Survey (ACS) 
supplied by the Integrated Public Use Micro-Data Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2010). Each year the 
ACS is based on a 1% sample representative for the U.S. population. Pooling across five years offers a 
5% sample and a similar range of variables as collected previously through the long-form of the U.S. 
Census including information on pre-tax personal total income or losses in income in the last 12 
month.  Total income2 includes wages and salaries, business income, income from investment 
(interest, royalties, income from trusts, etc.), social security income, welfare payments, retirement 
income, supplementary income and other income sources. All dollar values are deflated and 
expressed in constant 2011 dollars.  
In order to develop the cut-off for the top 1%, total income rather than wages and salaries was used 
and only respondents with positive incomes and above 16 years old were included to calculate this 
threshold. Hence, the 1% threshold was estimated from a (weighted) sample of 212.5 million 
individuals. This choice was made because rich entrepreneurs, the rich relying on non-wage incomes 
and rich retirees would not be classified among the top 1% if we would rely on salaries and wages 
only and because it is income not wages that determine what people can afford. As a result all 
respondents with incomes above 260,098 US$ become part of the top 1%. This threshold is lower 
than the one Piketty (2014, p. 292) cites for 2010, but well above his top 5% cut-off point of 150,000 
US$. For the purpose of this paper, respondents with incomes above 260,098 US$ are considered 
part of the top 1% while those with incomes below that threshold are part of the bottom 99%.  
The lower threshold for the top 1% in the ACS income data may have a number of reasons. The first 
is that income is self-reported and that respondents are more likely to solicit precise information on 
their income return to the IRS. The second may be related to the survey methodology. Each year, the 
Census Bureau targets 3.54 million (prior to 2011, 2.9 million) housing units that are interviewed 
over a twelve month period. As a result about 295,000 households are interviewed each month 
(prior 2011, 242,000). Housing units are sent a mail package and respondents encouraged to fill in 
the ACS questionnaires online. Those that fail to respond are then contacted again and given the 
option to fill out a hardcopy of the questionnaire. In a third stage 1 in 3 (in some instances 1 in 2) 
households are selected for a phone interview. In 2013, the response rate was over 60 percent 
                                                          
2
 Income differs from wealth which includes disposable assets such as owner-occupied housing, real estate, 
deposits, government bonds and financial securities, corporate stock and mutual funds, cash surrender value 
of pension plans, trust funds, equity in unincorporated business minus mortgage debt, consumer debt (eg. 
auto loans) and other debt (eg. educational loans) (Wolff 2012). Changes in wealth are driven primarily by 
changes in house prices and stock prices, while changes in income are driven largely by changes in wages. 
Because individuals and households with higher incomes are more likely to accumulate wealth and because 
wealth allows people to obtain better education leading to better paying jobs, income and wealth are 
correlated. Both indicators are relevant and complement each other. Because all but the very wealthy are 
dependent on income for making a living, differences and changes in income are more closely linked to 
economic growth, social mobility, health and crime outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Furthermore, the 
lack of wealth data in the ACS means that wealth inequality cannot be addressed in this paper.  
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(http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/methodology_main/).  Because of the sampling 
strategy it may be the case that rich households are less likely to fill out the survey. The Census 
Bureau does adjust non-responses through sample weights, but more careful research needs to be 
conducted through systematic comparison of IRS and ACS data. Another potential problem is the 
allocation of individuals to particular addresses. Especially the rich tend to own second homes in 
Florida, Wyoming or Long Island and some of them may be erroneously allocated to those places. 
And finally, because of the smaller sample size and higher error rates of monthly ACS surveys 
compared to the decennial census, information for small areas (below 65,000 individuals) are not 
released for annual data files. However, since the following analysis is based on the five-year pooled 
sample and the smallest geographic entities are PUMA areas, the results should not be biased. The 
most likely outcome of using the ACS is an under-estimation of income inequality, especially in areas 
with a relatively high percentage of the top 1%. This needs to be kept in mind when comparing 
areas.  
While there are potential problems with ACS based income measures, one advantage of using 
IPUMS rather than tax return data is the large number of socio-economic and demographic variables 
contained in IPUMS that allows us to produce a more detailed socio-economic profile of the top 1%. 
In addition, respondents can be attributed to metropolitan and PUMA areas (the smallest area for 
which data are reported in IPUMS that include at least 100,000 and usually not more than 200,000 
residents) so that we can obtain an understanding of the geography of the top 1%.  
 
PROFILING THE TOP 1%  
Table 1 compares the social and demographic characteristics of the top 1% with those of the bottom 
99%. Not surprisingly members of the top 1% tend to be well educated, male, white, married (with 
spouse present), over 45 years old and live in cities (primarily suburbs). Especially the uneven 
distributions of gender and race stick out with women, African Americans and Hispanics being 
strongly underrepresented among the top 1%.  The largest occupational group among the top 1% 
are surgeons and physicians (13.6%), followed by CEO’s (10.8%), lawyers (8.8%), miscellaneous 
managers (7.1%), financial mangers (2.9%) and accountants and auditors (2.8%). The high share of 
surgeons and physicians among the top 1% seems surprising and they are likely to drop out if we 
only were to look at the 0.1 or 0.01 percent (Breau 2014) where CEOs make up the biggest shares. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
High incomes appear to be passed on to children in form of better education. Only 3.4% of 15-19 
year old children with a parent among the top 1% are not in education compared to 13.4% of 
children with none of the parents in the top 1%. Even more striking is the difference in private school 
education. 33.0% of 6-17 year olds of children from the top 1% are enrolled in private schools 
compared to only 9.6% of children with both parents from the bottom 99%. In addition, school 
quality is related strongly to property taxes and house prices. Given that median annual property 
taxes of the top 1% are 6,500US$ and 3.5 times higher than median property taxes paid by the 
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bottom 99%, educational inequalities between the children of the top 1% and bottom 99% are likely 
to be even more pronounced than the private schooling figures suggest. And given that educational 
attainment is strongly linked to future income, a higher share of the top 1% will lead everything else 
equal, to lower social mobility (OECD 2008).  
 
WHERE DOES THE TOP 1% LIVE? 
According to the global cities literature, we would expect the rich to be concentrated in the largest 
cities. Table 2 offers a summary of the top 1% by city size classes. In line with the global cities 
literature, over 50% of the top 1% of the U.S. population lives in the 25 cities with more than 2 
million inhabitants (compared with 38.6% of the total population). A further 18.7% lives in the 43 
cities greater than 750,000 and less than 2 million inhabitants.  The share of the top 1% decreases 
with city size, although the share of the top 1% is greater than 1 in cities between 250,000 and 
400,000. This is due to Stamford, CT (which can be considered a rich suburb of New York City) where 
8% of the population belong to the top 1%. Excluding Stamford the value would drop to slightly 
above 0.8. The decline in the top 1% share along city size classes is also reflected in a decline in the 
Theil3 coefficient and the GE(2) measure. Large cities tend to be more unequal than smaller cities. 
However, larger cities also have higher median wages, higher labor force participation rates and 
lower poverty shares than smaller cities. Unemployment rates are fairly similar across city size 
classes. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
As for the U.S. as a whole, the vast majority of the rich is white. The share of minorities among the 
top 1% is higher in large cities than in small cities. However, this is a reflection of the ethnic 
composition of those cities. The share of whites among the top 1% in the largest cities is 1.5 times 
higher than the shares of whites among the bottom 99% in those cities. All ethnic minorities are 
underrepresented in the top 1% in the largest cities. Asians are overrepresented among the top 1% 
in all but the largest cities and have the best chance to make it into the top 1% in non-metropolitan 
and small metropolitan areas. African Americans are underrepresented in all areas. The share of 
African Americans in the top 1% is only 1/4th of their share among the bottom 99%. Hispanics are 
only slightly more likely to make it into the top 1% than African Americans. Hence, while the shares 
of ethnic minorities among the top 1% are higher in the largest cities, the probabilities of them 
making it into the top 1% are lower in those cities. 
In terms of educational attainment, the shares of members of the top 1% with BA, Masters and PhD 
are higher in the largest cities, while the share of those with an advanced degree other than Masters 
or PhD is higher in smaller cities. The differences in those shares reflect differences in the 
                                                          
3
 The Theil index and GE(2) (half the square of the coefficient of variation) are members of the Generalized 
Entropy class indices  of inequality that are commonly used in inequality studies (eg. Breau 2014; Jenkins 
2009). Compared with the Theil, the GE(2) is more sensitive to income differences at the top of the income 
distribution.   
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educational profiles of those cities for the populations as a whole. The main exception is that BAs in 
rural areas have a higher probability to make the top 1% than BAs in the largest cities.  
And finally, some interesting patterns in terms of private schooling emerge. First of all, the top 1% is 
more likely to send their children to private schools if they live in central cities. In the largest cities, 
almost two thirds of children from the top 1% are sent to private schools. In the suburbs, less than 
30% of children are sent to private schools. The discrepancy lessens with declining city size. While 
the share of rich central city children sent to private schools decreases with city size, those of rich 
suburban children increases. For the bottom 99% those shares decline only modestly with city size 
for central cities and suburbs. It appears that the top 1% are able to compensate for under-
resourced public schools in central locations by sending their children to private schools, while the 
bottom 99% rely on public educational institutions in those areas.  
While the functional specialization of cities related to their size is correlated with their share of the 
top 1%. that correlation is not perfect. Excluding Stamford the correlation coefficient between the 
share of the top 1% and the logarithm of metropolitan population size is 0.46. It is thus useful to 
have a closer look at the geography of the rich. Figure1 displays the share of the top 1% for each 
PUMA area and shows that PUMA areas with high shares of the rich are located in or next to large 
metropolitan areas including those in the Rustbelt (eg. Detroit). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The “richest” fifteen metropolitan areas (the metropolitan shares of the top 1% in parentheses)  are 
Stamford, CT (8%), San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA (3.1%), Naples, FL (2.8%), Danbury, CT (2.7%), 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray Beach, FL (2.2%), San Jose, CA (2.1%), Bridgeport, CT (2.0%), 
Nassau Co, NY (1.8%), Newark, NJ (1.8%),  Orange County, CA (1.8%), Washington DC/MD/VA (1.8%), 
New York-Northeastern NJ (1.8%), Boston MA (1.7%), Portland, ME (1.7%),  Bergen-Passaic NJ (1.7%) 
and  Oakland, CA (1.7%).  Seven of those metropolitan areas are in or in commuting distance from 
New York City. Hence, while surgeons and physicians are the occupational group with the highest 
percentage of people among the top 1%, the financial sector of New York City has a major impact on 
the concentration of rich in New York and surrounding cities and counties. 
While rich PUMA areas are located throughout the U.S. there appears to be a concentration of rich 
PUMA areas next to or in the large cities on the East coast (Boston, New York, Washington DC) and 
the West Coast (San Francisco, Los Angeles). In order to identify whether those clusters of rich 
PUMA areas are significantly different relative to U.S. averages, Local Indicators of Spatial 
Autocorrelation (LISA) were calculated providing a measure of spatial autocorrelation for individual 
PUMA areas within the U.S. as a whole (Anselin 1995). The Local Moran Statistic I for PUMA area i is  
 
𝐼𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑗 𝑗              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖   (1) 
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where the percentage of the rich for each PUMA area i, xi , are normalized (zi=[xi-?̅?]/s) and the 
spatial weights matrix (W) is row-standardized so that the sum of weights along any row equal 1. 
The local Moran statistic for area i is thus the product of the normalized value of the share of the top 
1% in PUMA area i and the average normalized top 1% shares in the neighbouring PUMA areas. 
Neighbours are defined as PUMA areas that share a common border (Queen contiguity).  High LISA 
values indicate spatial clustering of similar values while low LISA values indicate spatial clustering of 
dissimilar values. Figure 2 maps those LISA values that are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Significance is assessed by comparing the observed distribution of the top 1% income shares with a 
conditional random assignment (Anselin 1995).  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Dark red areas indicate areas with relatively high shares of the top 1% surrounded by PUMA areas 
with relatively high top 1% shares while dark blue areas indicate PUMA areas with relatively low top 
1% shares surrounded by areas with relatively low top 1% shares. Light red areas indicate PUMA 
areas with relatively high top 1% shares surrounded by PUMA areas with relatively low top 1% 
shares, while light blue indicate areas with relatively low top 1% shares neighboured by areas that 
generally have higher than average top 1% shares. High income clusters are labelled on the map. 
New York includes Danbury, CT, Bridgeport, CT, and Stamford CT, while the San Francisco Bay Area 
includes San Jose and Santa Cruz and Los Angeles includes Oxnard-Simi Valley. Clusters with low 
percentages of the top 1% emerge in some areas of the rustbelt, the Appalachians, along the 
Mississippi, rural Georgia and New Mexico. Because it is more difficult to identify PUMA areas with 
low percentages of the top 1% in metropolitan areas, Figure 3 offers higher resolution maps for 
metropolitan areas with clusters of PUMA areas with low percentages of the top 1% within 
metropolitan areas. No detailed maps for Atlanta and Houston are provided in Figure 3 as there are 
no clusters of areas with relatively low percentages of the top 1% in Houston and because the 
pattern of spatial inequality is readily observable for Atlanta in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Boston is characterized by a big cluster of PUMA areas with high percentages of the top 1% and one 
PUMA area in South Boston with a relatively low share of the top 1%. In Chicago we observe a “rich” 
cluster in the North and a “poor” cluster in South. The pattern in Detroit is more complex. The City of 
Detroit is characterized by a large cluster of PUMA areas with low percentages of the top 1%, while 
the top 1% tends to reside in some Northern suburbs. In Los Angeles the rich cluster in the Western 
parts (Oxnard-Simi Valley) and along the Hollywood Hills, while clusters with low percentages of the 
top 1% are found in Central L.A. and parts of San Bernardino County. The San Francisco Bay Area is 
characterized by a large cluster of high income areas centered on Silicon Valley (San Jose and Santa 
Cruz) but also has areas of relatively low percentages of the top 1% east of the Bay. In Washington 
DC, the top 1% spread out from the Western part of the city towards the rich suburbs of Maryland 
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and Virginia. The most complex geography emerges in New York. There are a number of distinct 
“rich” and “poor” clusters. The top 1% cluster in (1) Manhattan and Park Slope (Bronx County); (2) 
the Northern parts of Westchester County, Stamford, Danbury and Bridgeport, CT; (3) New Jersey in 
proximity to Princeton; and (4) parts of Long Island. There are also a number of clusters of low 
percentages of the top 1% in (1) Bronx county; (2) Parts of Queens and Brooklyn; and (3) New Jersey 
in vicinity of Jersey City and Elizabeth. The spatial separation of the rich and poor in metropolitan 
areas like New York, Los Angeles and Detroit is confirmed by high dissimilarity4 and low interaction 
indices (see Figure 4 below).  After offering a broad overview of the characteristics and geography of 
the top 1%, the following section explores the relationship between the share of the top 1% and 
potential implications for the bottom 99%.  
 
THE SHARE OF THE TOP 1% AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE BOTTOM 99% 
(1) Education, employment and income 
The share of the top1% (Stamford is excluded from the calculations) is positively correlated with the 
Theil index (0.61), GE(2) (0.54), labor force participation rate (0.35) and median income (0.58), but 
negatively related to poverty rates (-0.42) and unemployment rates (-0.22). Notice that the Theil and 
and GE(2) are negatively correlated to unemployment rate (though not statistically significant), labor 
force participation rates, median incomes and positively related to poverty rates.  In general, more 
unequal cities (with high Theil and GE(2) coefficients) are those with higher poverty rates, lower 
participation rates and lower median incomes, but that people in cities with a relatively high 
percentage of the top 1% are those with lower poverty and unemployment rates and higher labor 
force participation rates and median incomes.  The negative correlation coefficients between 
poverty rates and the share of the top 1% are the result of higher median wages in those cities 
because poverty thresholds are not adjusted by cost of living (see note Table2). Once we control for 
differences in median income, the relationship between poverty rates and the share of the top 1% 
turns positive (although it is not statistically significant)5. In other words, a higher share of the top 
1% does not lower urban poverty rates once we control for metropolitan differences in median 
income. On the other hand, the positive relationship between the two inequality indices and poverty 
rates persist after controlling for wage differences.  
 
Table 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
While there appears to be a positive effect of the share of the top 1% on employment opportunities 
and wages, the question is what kinds of jobs are generated and how widely potential benefits are 
spread among the populations in those cities. In order to answer this question, Table 4 reports the 
correlation coefficients between the share of the top 1% in a metropolitan area and the location 
                                                          
4
 For a precise definition of the dissimilarity and interaction indices please see equations (2) and (3) below.  
5
 A simple linear regression model with metropolitan poverty rates as independent and the metropolitan share 
of the top 1% and logarithm of the median income as independent variables yields a parameter estimate of 
0.71 with a t-value of 1.54 for the share of the top 1%. The estimate is positive but not statistically significant.  
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quotients, labor force participation rates, unemployment rates and median incomes for the 
metropolitan area for each skill/education level6. A location quotient >1 for a particular education 
level means that the population with this education level is overrepresented in a metropolitan area. 
The correlation coefficients are depicted for the whole sample of metropolitan areas (minus 
Stamford) and for those with 2 million or more inhabitants only. The results tend to be consistent 
although the level of association is much higher if we look at the top 25 metropolitan areas only. 
Columns 2 and 6 reveal that the share of the highly educated (BA degree or higher) is positively 
correlated with the metropolitan shares of the top 1%. This is unsurprising as we know that that the 
highly educated are overrepresented among the top 1% (see Table 1). More interesting is the 
distribution at the bottom of the educational distribution. The share of the population with very low 
levels of education (prior to high school) tends to be positively (although insignificantly) correlated 
with the share of the top 1%, while the share of those with Grade 10 up to an Associate’s degree are 
significantly negatively correlated with the share of the top 1% suggesting increasing educational 
polarization in metropolitan areas with relatively large shares of the top 1%.  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to explore the potential impact of the share of the top 1% on the bottom 99%, the labour 
force participation rates, unemployment rates and median wages were calculated for the bottom 
99% only and correlated with the share of the top 1% in a metropolitan area. Labor force 
participation rates for the low skilled are higher in metropolitan areas with a high percentage of the 
top 1% but this is not the case for higher education groups. This may result from the fact that costs 
are higher in cities with a high share of the top 1% forcing those with little education to pick up low 
paid jobs, or from increased job opportunities for the unskilled that are available in those cities. The 
second conjecture is supported in part by lower unemployment rates for the unskilled in cities with 
higher shares of the top 1%. So not only are the unskilled overrepresented in the population and 
more likely to participate in the labour force, but this group is also less likely to be unemployed in 
cities with a higher share of the top 1%. Unemployment rates are not negatively correlated with top 
1% shares for people with better skill levels, although the group with Grade 10 and Grade 12 
(without high school diploma) education have lower unemployment rates in large cities with higher 
shares of the top 1% (see Table 4, column 8). And finally, Table 4 suggests that groups with higher 
education levels receive higher median wages in cities with a high share of the top 1% while this is 
not the case for the groups with less education. In other words, in places where the rich live, wages 
for the higher skilled tend to be higher, but this does not trickle down to those groups with low 
education levels. Because the correlation coefficients are based on a single cross section it is 
impossible to infer causality. We do not know if the rich generate jobs for low skilled workers or 
whether the rich and unskilled happen to live in cities with economic structures that provide jobs for 
the unskilled and the highly skilled.  
  
                                                          
6
 Although the level of education is not directly related to a person’s skill level, it is a good proxy for skill.  
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(2) Housing 
Whether or not better economic opportunities or higher wages translate into higher standards of 
living depends also on the cost of living. Higher wages among the highly skilled may drive up prices 
for the services they provide and demand. In order to examine this hypothesis it would be necessary 
to obtain detailed data on prices of services, products but also consumption patterns for families or 
individuals with different educational backgrounds. This kind of information is not available in the 
American Community Survey. However, a big expenditure item is accommodation. Rents and 
housing costs could be driven up in cities with higher median wages. And this information is 
available in the ACS.   
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients of the share of the top 1% with selected owner cost, rent, 
and two income/housing cost variables (median monthly household income / selected monthly 
owner cost and median monthly household income / monthly rent) by skill level for all metropolitan 
areas and for the top 25 metropolitan areas separately. Both, selected owner costs and monthly 
rent, are positively correlated with the share of the top 1%. Hence, while median wages and 
household incomes are higher in metropolitan areas with a large share of the top 1%, so are cost for 
accommodation. The question is whether costs outstrip higher incomes. Columns 4-5 and 8-9 
demonstrate that the income/cost ratios for all but one education group are negatively correlated 
with the share of the top 1% and this negative relationship is strongest for the higher skilled groups.  
 
(3) Segregation 
The literature on segregation proposes that group differences are intensified if groups are spatially 
segregated (Massey 2007). If the top 1% does not know how the bottom 99% lives their members 
are less likely to agree to re-distributive policies. Furthermore, if the rich live in enclaves they are 
able to develop exclusive infrastructures (backed by higher property taxes or private services) and 
rely less on government provided services and thus, are even more likely to oppose re-distributive 
policies.  In order to examine whether cities with a high percentage of the top 1% are more 
segregated than cities with lower percentages, the dissimilarity and interaction indices are 
calculated for the 25 largest cities. Usually, segregation is measured at the census tract or block 
level. Unfortunately the smallest geographic unit for the IPUMS data are PUMA areas. AS PUMA 
areas contain at least 100,000 people, income variation within PUMA areas may be substantial and 
the results have to be interpreted with caution. It is likely that segregation at the tract or census 
block level is considerably higher than at the PUMA area level.  
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Massey and Denton (1988) identified five dimensions of segregation. Here, we are interested in how 
equally the rich and poor are distributed across metropolitan areas and how likely it is that the top 
1% interact with the bottom 99%. For this purpose the dissimilarity index and the 
exposure/interaction index are calculated. The dissimilarity index D is defined as: 
𝐷 =
1
2
∑ |
𝑥𝑖
𝑋
−
𝑦𝑖
𝑌
|𝑛𝑖=1   (2) 
where xi and yi are the number of individuals in the top 1% and bottom 99% in PUMA area i and X 
and Y are the number of individuals in the top 1% and bottom 99% for the metropolitan area as a 
whole. The dissimilarity index measures the degree of departure from an even residential 
distribution. It computes the number of minority group members who would have to change 
neighborhoods (here defined as PUMA areas) to achieve an even distribution and expresses that 
quantity as a proportion of the number that would have to change areas under conditions of 
maximum unevenness. The index varies between 0 and 1. Only changes of minority members from 
areas where they are overrepresented to areas where they are underrepresented affect the index.  
The second dimension of segregation is exposure or interaction and refers to the degree of potential 
contact between groups within neighborhoods of a city. It measures the extent to which groups 
must physically confront one another because they share a residential area. Rather than measuring 
segregation as a departure from an abstract ideal of “evenness”, exposure indices depend on the 
share of each group in the city. Minority groups may be distributed equally across different areas in 
a city but at the same time experience relatively little exposure to the majority group members if 
they constitute a relatively large share of the population in the city. Hence, we would expect the top 
1% to be less likely to interact with the bottom 99% in cities where they constitute a relatively large 
share of the urban population. More specifically the interaction index is defined as  
𝑥𝑃∗𝑦 = ∑ [
𝑥𝑖
𝑋
]𝑛𝑖=1 [
𝑦𝑖
𝑡𝑖
]  (3) 
where xi, yi and ti are the number of individuals in the top 1%, the number of individuals in the 
bottom 99% and the total population in a PUMA area i. The index varies between 0 and 1 and gives 
the probability that a randomly drawn member of the top 1% shares a neighbourhood with a 
member of the bottom 99%.   
Figure 4 reports the dissimilarity and interaction indices for the largest 25 metropolitan areas. The 
size of the bubble is determined by the share of the top 1%7. In general, cities with larger shares of 
the top 1% tend to be more segregated. The correlation coefficients of the top 1% shares with the 
dissimilarity and interaction indices are +0.25 and -0.77 respectively. The correlation coefficient 
between the dissimilarity and interaction index is -0.73. The most segregated large city with low 
interaction and high dissimilarity is New York, a city with a high share of the top 1%. This was 
expected given the patterns of spatial clustering observed in Figure 3. Other highly segregated cities 
are Detroit, Los Angeles, St. Louis, San Francisco and Washington DC. Detroit, Los Angeles and St. 
Louis are characterized by highly uneven spatial distributions of the top 1% and the bottom 99% but 
their shares of the top 1% are relatively small compared to the other metropolitan areas. In San 
                                                          
7
 In order to raise visibility of the differences between top 1% shares they have been raised to the power of 
four. This means that the size of the bubbles exaggerate differences in top 1% shares. The correlation 
coefficients are based on actual top 1% shares. 
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Francisco and Washington DC the share of the top 1% is high and their interaction indices are 
relatively small. On the other hand, Riverside-San Bernardino, Orlando, Minneapolis, Tampa, 
Pittsburgh and Portland, OR are cities with relatively low levels of segregation (high interaction and 
low dissimilarity indices) and relatively low shares of the top 1%. The results indicate a relationship 
between the share of the top 1% and spatial segregation8 although the analysis needs to be carried 
out for census tract and block levels to arrive at corroborate these results.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Using Census data provided by the University of Minnesota’s  Integrated Public  Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et  al. 2010) this paper offered a summary of the detailed social-
demographic characteristics and geography of the top 1% in the United States. The analysis confirms 
that educated, white, married, over 45 year old men living in outlying districts of metropolitan areas 
are highly over-represented among the top 1%. 40% of the top 1% is made up of Surgeons and 
Physicians, CEOs, lawyers and financial managers and accountants and 70% of them live in cities with 
more than 750,000 inhabitants (over 50% in the 25 cities with more than 2 million people).  Hence, if 
incomes of the top 1% pull away even further from the bottom 99% we can expect increasing levels 
of gender and ethnic income inequalities. This result is consistent with research documenting 
increasing ethnic disparities in wealth accumulation (McKernan et al. 2013).  A third of the top 1% 
(two thirds in large central city areas) send their children to private schools. In addition, median 
property taxes of the top 1% are 3.5 times higher than those of the bottom 99%. As local schools are 
funded, in part, through property taxes, children of the rich attend better resourced schools. And as 
educational attainment is correlated with future income, existing levels of inequality are so 
maintained or exacerbated over time.  
Metropolitan areas with higher percentages of the rich are those with higher labour force 
participation rates and lower unemployment rates among the less educated and higher wages for 
the better educated. The low and highly educated are over-represented while those from the mid-
educational groups are underrepresented in cities with higher shares of the top 1%. Better economic 
circumstances in form of higher participation and lower unemployment rates for the least educated 
and higher wages for the well educated in those cities seem to be eroded by higher housing costs 
especially for groups with better education. And finally, cities with higher shares of the rich also tend 
to be cities that are more spatially segregated which may translate into lower levels of support for 
distributional policies and expenditure on public services such as education and health facilities.  
The analysis of this paper was exploratory with the intention to construct a socio-demographic and 
geographical profile of the top 1% and opens up a number of avenues for future research. First, in 
order to calibrate income data from the ACS, it would be useful to compare IRS based income 
estimates with those from the ACS and the long-form census. Because it is likely that incomes 
reported to the Census are lower than those reported to the IRS, we can expect that actual income 
inequalities are even higher than those reported in this paper. Second, while high shares of the top 
1% seem to generate economic benefits for the lower skilled in form of lower unemployment rates 
                                                          
8
 Notice that only the relationship to the exposure index is statistically significant. This result holds even after 
controlling for population size and the number of PUMA areas in a metropolitan area.  
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and the better skilled in form of higher wages, the causal channels generating those relationships 
need to be explored. Do the rich generate job opportunities for the less educated or do they simply 
co-habit cities with better job opportunities? While the analysis could be advanced with publicly 
available data, we would also need information on expenditure patterns of the top 1% and detailed 
urban input-output tables to ascertain whether they do indeed generate jobs for the lower skilled. 
While the rich may indeed generate a “serving class” the main point is though why we would want a 
large part of the population “serving” only 1% of the population instead of providing socially 
beneficial services for everybody (as public rather than private teachers, social care workers, public 
park keepers, street cleaners, public rather that private child care workers, etc).  Third, while the 
analysis suggests a relationship between the percentage of the rich and housing costs, more detailed 
information is required on how the top 1% affect those costs. We know that house prices vary for 
many reasons and to isolate the effects that the top 1% have on rising house prices may prove 
difficult (although there is no question that a rich, international group of people influences property 
prices in cities such as London or New York (Dorling 2014)). Furthermore, house prices are only part 
of people’s expenditure and it would be important to examine if and how prices of other necessities 
(in particular non-tradable services) are driven up by the presence of the top 1%. Fourth, the analysis 
on segregation needs to be carried out at the tract and block level to reduce the impact of income 
heterogeneity within PUMA areas on segregation measures. Furthermore, information from social 
attitude surveys are required to develop and test theoretical links between spatial segregation and 
social attitudes and behaviours of the rich and poor as currently developed by the neighbourhood 
effect literature (eg.Bailey et al. 2013; Finney and Jivraj 2013). This work needs to extend to the 
relationship between spatial segregation and provision of public services in different parts of 
metropolitan areas and their impact on the incomes and life chances of the bottom 99%. Two of the 
obvious areas to investigate are education and health services. Fifth, this analysis only focused on 
one point in time. This is useful for exploratory purposes but insufficient for identifying the causal 
processes leading to those metropolitan differences in inequality in the first place. Annual ACS data 
are available for the largest counties and metropolitan areas and could be used to examine changes 
in income inequality over time.  
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Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of the Top 1% 
 Top 1 % Bottom 99% 
Number of obs.   
Gender (percent female) 16.80 51.70 
Age group(percent) 
  <36 6.73 35.0 
36-45 24.85 17.48 
46-55 33.63 18.16 
56-65 23.47 14.03 
66-75 7.86 8.31 
Education (percent) 
  Bachelor's degree 31.23 16.67 
Master's degree 18.12 6.57 
Professional degree beyond BA 25.00 1.55 
PhD  6.27 1.04 
Marital Status (percent) 
  Married, spouse present 80.16 49.19 
Married, spouse absent 1.69 2.48 
Separated 1.14 2.31 
Divorced 7.69 11.65 
Widowed 2.24 6.74 
Occupations (percent) 
  Physicians and surgeons 13.55 0.37 
Chief executives 10.79 0.60 
Lawyers 8.75 0.56 
Miscellaneous managers 7.07 1.97 
Financial managers 2.85 0.66 
Accountants and Auditors 2.82 1.29 
Race/ethnicity (percent) 
  White 86.82 68.94 
Black 2.64 11.31 
Hispanic 3.79 13.14 
Asian 5.68 4.53 
Location(percent) 
  Rural 11.3 26.0 
Suburbs 63.1 50.1 
Central city 25.6 23.9 
Education of children 
  percentage not enrolled in school (15-19 year old) 3.43 13.43 
percent in private school (6-17) 33.04 9.64 
Area related(all values in US$)   
Median property taxes  6,500 1,850 
Median house values  625,000 187,500 
Median selected monthly owner costs 2,717 1,106 
Median rent 1,525 679 
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Table 2: Metropolitan inequality and selected characteristics of the Top 1% 
     
City size class 
  
  
  >2 mill 
<2mill-
750k 
<750k-
400k 
<400k-
250k <250k 
non-
metro 
         Number of metropolitan areas 25 43 51 53 111 0 
Population share  
 
38.61 17.68 9.05 5.46 5.93 23.27 
         Theil 
  
0.513 0.476 0.469 0.484 0.461 0.448 
GE(2) 
  
0.837 0.755 0.745 0.782 0.727 0.709 
Top 1% share of urban population 1.356 1.062 0.883 1.012 0.664 0.513 
 
share of US top 1% 51.440 18.651 8.120 5.591 4.020 12.178 
         Labour Force Participation rate 73.11 72.90 71.85 71.14 70.63 67.80 
Unemployment rate 8.81 8.59 8.92 8.54 8.34 8.49 
         Median income (in US$) 
 
29350 26426 25247 24936 23313 22000 
         Poverty rates 
 
14.56 15.89 16.37 17.62 19.31 18.87 
Poor as share of U.S. Poor 34.26 17.12 9.02 5.86 6.98 26.76 
         Selected characteristics of top 1% 
      
         Ethnicity White % 
 
84.94 85.51 90.48 89.15 90.01 92.19 
 
African American % 2.89 2.97 2.21 2.17 2.15 1.75 
 
Asian % 
 
6.83 6.11 3.81 4.47 3.80 2.61 
 
Hispanic % 
 
4.28 4.24 2.49 3.34 3.07 2.30 
         Education BA % 
 
32.58 32.51 29.72 31.21 25.68 26.43 
 
Masters % 20.97 17.00 15.86 18.20 11.36 11.46 
 
Other degree % 24.68 24.78 27.86 25.77 30.50 22.60 
 
Phd % 
 
20.97 17.00 15.86 18.20 11.36 11.46 
         Private Schooling (in %) citywide 33.39 35.87 36.01 32.83 31.67 24.61 
  
central cities 
only 62.32 48.08 48.55 48.21 43.31 n.a. 
  
suburbs only 28.65 33.02 31.80 33.97 39.48 n.a. 
         
Ownership (in US$) 
Median 
property tax 
        
7,500  
            
5,250  
         
4,450  
          
6,500  
      
4,050  
          
3,050  
  
Median house 
value 
    
875,000  
        
625,000  
      
450,000  
      
625,000  
   
450,000  
      
350,000  
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table 3: The top 1% and metropolitan inequality, poverty and labor market outcomes 
       
 
Theil GE2 
Poverty 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Participation 
Rate 
Median 
income 
Top 1% share 0.61** 0.54**  -0.43** -0.22**       0.35** 0.58** 
Theil  0.93** 0.25** -0.07 -0.16** -0.05 
GE2   0.24** -0.02 -0.19** -0.15** 
Notes: ** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The poverty rate is based on the Poverty Status 
variable and expresses each family’s total income as a percentage of (family size dependent) poverty 
thresholds established by the Social Security Administration. A person living below the poverty 
threshold (Poverty value <100) is defined as poor. The poverty rate of a city is calculated as the 
percentage of poor divided by all people living in a metropolitan area. The poverty thresholds are 
not adjusted for variations in cost of living. Hence, cities with higher median family incomes will have 
lower poverty rates even if cost of living in those cities is higher. Once we control for differences in 
median income, the share of the top 1% is positively related to urban poverty rates (see footnote 2).   
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients between the top 1% shares and employment characteristics by skill/education level of the bottom 99% 
 All metro areas (n=283) 
 Metropolitan areas with Population > 2 million 
(n=25) 
Skill / education level LQ  LF PR UR MWage  LQ LF PR UR MWage 
No schooling completed -0.08  0.27** -0.13* 0.06 
 
 0.31 0.44* -0.45* 0.30 
Nursery school to grade 4 0.02 0.21** -0.06 -0.01 
 
 0.29 0.47* -0.40* -0.04 
Grade 5 or 6 0.06 0.25** -0.03 0.04 
 
 0.25 0.45* -0.37+ 0.11 
Grade 7 or 8 -0.15* 0.28** -0.12* 0.05 
 
 0.14 0.54** -0.39+ 0.28 
Grade 9 -0.18** 0.26** -0.06 0.11+ 
 
 -0.02 0.42* -0.50* 0.20 
Grade 10 -0.30** 0.05 -0.12* 0.08 
 
 -0.50* -0.03 -0.52** 0.43* 
Grade 11 -0.30** -0.03 -0.05 0.15* 
 
 -0.55** -0.30 -0.27 0.28 
12th grade, no diploma  -0.07 0.20** -0.11+ 0.12* 
 
 -0.19 0.17 -0.53** 0.40* 
High school graduate or GED -0.39** 0.23** -0.03 0.26** 
 
 -0.66** 0.25 -0.33 0.37+ 
Some college, but less than 1 year -0.40**     0.14* 0.02 0.39** 
 
 -0.65** -0.18 -0.05 0.57** 
1 or more years of college credit, no degree -0.15*     0.11+ 0.01 0.35** 
 
 -0.27 -0.23 -0.21 0.52** 
Associate's degree, type not specified -0.22** -0.01 0.05 0.31** 
 
 -0.51** 0.03 -0.18 0.53** 
Bachelor's degree 0.58** -0.13* 0.05 0.39** 
 
 0.68** 0.27 -0.08 0.64** 
Master's degree 0.57** -0.08 0.25** 0.39** 
 
 0.62** 0.37+ 0.08 0.59** 
Professional degree beyond a BA 0.68** -0.02 0.05 0.24** 
 
 0.70** 0.18 0.08 0.63** 
Doctoral degree 0.28** -0.00 -0.01 0.19** 
 
 0.65** 0.49* 0.15 0.60** 
Notes: LQ=Location quotient of 16-70 year olds for each education level: LQ>1 means that metro population is over-represented in this education level 
relative to nation as a whole; LF PR = Labor force participation rate; UR = Unemployment rate; MWage = Median Wage (only those with >=48 weeks of work 
were included to calculate annual median wages, because usual hours of work are not reported in ACS); LFR, UR, MWage are for each skill level in each 
metropolitan area. Education levels: Prior to Grade 9 means no High School qualification; Grade 9 – 12 attended High School;  Statistically significant at the 
0.01 (**), 0.05 (*), 0.1 (+) levels.  
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Tab le 5: Correlation coefficients between the share of the top 1% and ownership costs, rent and affordability of the bottom 99% per skill level 
 All metro areas (n=283) 
 Metropolitan areas with Population > 2 
million (n=25) 
Skill/education level OC Rent 
Income 
/OC 
Income 
/Rent 
 
OC Rent 
Income 
/ OC 
Income 
/rent 
No schooling completed 0.53** 0.46** -0.20** -0.09  
 
0.63** 0.52** -0.20 -0.02 
Nursery school to grade 4 0.31** 0.39** -0.11+ -0.16**  
 
0.52** 0.49* -0.24 -0.06 
Grade 5 or 6 0.39** 0.29** -0.13* -0.13*  
 
0.61** 0.51** -0.20 0.10 
Grade 7 or 8 0.42** 0.40** -0.24** -0.08  
 
0.66** 0.46* -0.19 -0.06 
Grade 9 0.28** 0.44** -0.19** -0.09  
 
0.64** 0.48* -0.44* -0.11 
Grade 10 0.36** 0.36** -0.21** -0.08  
 
0.61** 0.46* -0.31 -0.05 
Grade 11 0.26** 0.45** -0.29** 0.00  
 
0.55** 0.40+ -0.55** -0.06 
12th grade, no diploma 0.43** 0.29** -0.22** -0.13*  
 
0.60** 0.45* -0.39+ -0.18 
High school graduate or GED 0.40** 0.46** -0.39** -0.35**  
 
0.61** 0.46* -0.45* -0.22 
Some college, but less than 1 year 0.43** 0.46** -0.36** -0.17**  
 
0.60** 0.50* -0.41* -0.28 
1 or more years of college credit, no degree 0.45** 0.49** -0.38** -0.22**  
 
0.61** 0.53** -0.42* -0.15 
Associate's degree, type not specified 0.46** 0.45** -0.37** -0.22**  
 
0.61** 0.48* -0.45* -0.23 
Bachelor's degree 0.51** 0.53** -0.34** -0.29**  
 
0.62** 0.58** -0.41* -0.20 
Master's degree 0.50** 0.48** -0.36** -0.25**  
 
0.63** 0.61** -0.40* -0.34* 
Professional degree beyond a bachelor's degree 0.51** 0.33** -0.34** -0.19**  
 
0.66** 0.70** -0.46* -0.27 
Doctoral degree 0.48** 0.35** -0.33** -0.16**  
 
0.63** 0.66** -0.38+ -0.19 
Notes: OC = Selected owner cost; Rent = Monthly rent; Income / OC = Monthly median household income (of owners) divided by selected monthly OC; 
Income / Rent = Monthly median household income (of renters) divided by monthly rent; The sample are all bottom 99% households; The educational level 
of a household is based on the education level of the household head. Statistically significant at the 0.01 (**), 0.05 (*), 0.1 (+) levels.  
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Figure 1: The geographic distribution of the top 1% 
Percent of top 1%  
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Figure 2: Clusters of metropolitan areas with high and low shares of the top 1% 
  
San Francisco Bay  Area 
Washington, DC 
St. Louis 
Chicago 
De
West Palm Beach 
Atlanta 
Los Angeles 
Houston 
not significant 
high-high 
low-low 
low-high 
high-low 
Legend: 
 
Notes: p=0.01; Number of permutations=999; High-high: Relatively high values surrounded by relatively high values; low-low: relatively low values surrounded by 
relatively low values; low-high: relatively low values surrounded by relatively high values; high-low: relatively high values surrounded by relatively low values.  
Boston 
New York 
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Figure 3: Clusters in and around metropolitan areas 
 
  
Boston 
 
Chicago 
 
Detroit 
 
Los Angeles 
 
St. Louis 
 
 
San Francisco 
 
Washington DC 
 
 
 
New York 
 
 
Baltimore 
Stamford, Bridgeport, Danbury CT 
not significant 
high-high 
low-low 
low-high 
high-low 
Legend: 
 
Notes: p=0.01; Number of permutations=999; High-high: Relatively high values surrounded by relatively high values; low-low: relatively low values surrounded by 
relatively low values; low-high: relatively low values surrounded by relatively high values; high-low: relatively high values surrounded by relatively low values.  
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Figure 4: Share of the top 1% and income segregation 
 
Correlation coefficients:  
Dissimilarity index with Top 1% share: 0.25 
Interaction index with Top1% share: -0.77 
Dissimilarity index with interaction index: -0.73 
Note: The size of the bubble reflects the share of the top 1% in a metropolitan area; In order to improve visibility the top 1% shares were raised to the 
power of 4.  
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